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In this Survey year, there are relatively few developments in the law of
ADR. Were this to be a survey of the developments in the practice of
ADR, this article could be hundreds of pages long. This year, however,
there are no reported appellate cases to summarize pertaining to media-
tion, only an update on a recent controversial legislative development.
And in the field of arbitration, although controversy abounds, the most
significant development involved a U.S. Supreme Court decision on the
waiver of class action clauses in consumer and employment contracts.
This article will address developments in mediation and arbitration dur-
ing the Survey year.
I. MEDIATION
The practice of mediation continues to grow at a seemingly exponential
rate.1 Fueled by jurisdictions where courts habitually order that every
case on the docket be mediated before trial, as well as the insertion of
non-binding mediation clauses in virtually every kind of contract used in
our society, there appears to be no end in the growth.2 The increase is
also seen in the number of mediations taking place pre-suit, even where
there is no pre-dispute mediation clause, because experienced players re-
alize that if mediation is inevitable, why not give it a shot at the outset
and possibly save everyone time and money?3
So the universe of mediation is ever expanding, but at the same time,
satisfaction levels may be heading in a different direction.4 The overall
decrease in settlement rates; the lawyers’ failure—perhaps burned out by
too many mediations—to prepare the client or the mediator; the increas-
ing request for a half day mediation when a full day commitment is
needed; and the pervasive sight of many mediations where one or more
participants are not physically present but participate by phone; these are
all symptoms of a participant population that often does not take an up-
coming mediation as seriously as it should, and certainly not as seriously
* Will Pryor is a mediator and arbitrator in Dallas. Yale University, B.A., 1978;
Harvard Law School, J.D., 1981.
1. See WILL PRYOR, A SHORT AND HAPPY GUIDE TO MEDIATION 2–3 (2014).
2. See id. at 126.
3. See, e.g., Mike Christiansen, Five Compelling Reasons to Build a Presuit Mediation
Clause into Your Business Contracts, 84 FLA. B.J. 44, 44–45 (2010).
4. See PRYOR, supra note 1, at 127–29.
3
4 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 2
as it used to.5
Perhaps of greatest concern is the trend in Texas and across the country
that favors skipping the joint session at the outset of the mediation.6
Twenty years ago it was almost unthinkable that the process would omit
its most important component, the joint session. Now the suggestion that
the convening of the parties be dispensed with is a routine, daily occur-
rence.7 What changed? Was it a statute, a judicial opinion, or the rules
pertaining to the mediation process? No. The only change over the years
has been the volume of experience, and advocates seem to have decided
that joint sessions are either inefficient or unnecessary (“the lawyers
know each other’s case inside and out”), or will be too emotional, polariz-
ing, counterproductive, or too adversarial. Is it not revealing that these
objections were not routinely raised twenty years ago?
In this Survey year, there is an unremarkable absence of appellate deci-
sions involving mediation. As is often noted, this is as it should be. By its
nature, the mediation process is informal, and court interaction should be
unnecessary. To repeat from a prior survey:
Over the maturing course of experience with court-referred media-
tion, there have been a few issues subject to judicial comment and
participation, most notably whether a “good faith” obligation is re-
quired of mediation participants, and the meaning and application of
“confidentiality” and “privilege” in the ADR statute. But these is-
sues were not addressed in appellate decisions or by the Texas legis-
lature in [our survey year].8
But a brief, if inconclusive, follow up on changes to Rule 169 of the
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure may be appropriate.9 In 2013, the Texas
Legislature enacted House Bill 274, which mandated that the Texas Su-
preme Court adopt rules that would lower the cost and expedite litigation
of relatively modest cases.10 In response, the supreme court adopted Rule
169, which removed judicial discretion to order the parties to mediation
in circumstances where the parties agree to not mediate and the amount
in controversy is less than $100,000.00.11 When the parties cannot agree
to not mediate and a court orders mediation, the mediation is limited to
one half day and the cost is limited to twice the amount of the filing fee.12
5. See generally id. at 125–41 (Chapter 7, “What’s Wrong with the Process These
Days and How Can We Fix It?” gives a more thorough discussion on the problem of
mediation).
6. See id. at 129–34.
7. See id.
8. Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 61 SMU L. REV. 519, 520 (2008).
9. See Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 101,
116–17 (2014), http://smulawreview.law.smu.edu/getattachment/Journals/TX-Survey/2015-
Texas-Survey/Alternative-Dispute-Resolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TAY-W3G2] (discuss-
ing the controversy surrounding the (then) proposed Rule 169).
10. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.004 (West 2015).
11. Id. § 22.004 (a), (h).
12. TEX. R. CIV. P. 169(d)(4).
2016] Alternative Dispute Resolution 5
This change might strike a disinterested observer as unremarkable
(why should two parties in a modest case who do not want to incur the
time and expense of a mediation be required to mediate?). When it was
proposed, however, the change created an uproar in the ADR commu-
nity.13 Neutral organizations reacted hysterically.14 The controversy re-
vealed one of the unintended consequences of the 1987 ADR Statute: A
protective new constituency. The growth in the number of professional
neutral persons and organizations had created a new constituency, profes-
sionals who perceived any invasion of their “turf”—their core business—
as something to be fought, regardless of the merits of the possible im-
provement in our system of civil justice.15
Judge Frank Evans, the father of ADR in Texas, recently opined that
there is no data or other objective factors to which we can turn to deter-
mine if changes to Rule 169 have made any discernible impact on our
judicial system.16 Unlike most others in the ADR community, Judge Ev-
ans calmly suggests that there is no reason not to examine and re-ex-
amine ways that dispute resolution in our state can be improved and
made more affordable.17
This author believes that the Rule 169 ruckus was a crack in the dam
after nearly three decades of “mediation, everywhere all the time” and
the judicial use—occasional abuse and over-use—of mediation referrals
to maintain docket control. In the future, participants will likely recog-
nize that not every dispute should be mediated and acknowledge that
mediation has, at times, evolved into another layer of delay and expense
in certain litigated matters.
II. ARBITRATION
Judicial interaction with arbitration occurs principally on two occa-
sions: (1) at the outset, whether parties are compelled to arbitrate by a
binding, valid arbitration clause, and (2) at the conclusion, whether an
arbitration award should be enforced or set aside.18 We will cover judicial
decisions in these areas, as well as a few others where judicial scrutiny is
less common.
13. See generally Robert C. Rodriguez, Texas Expands Loser Pays Rule, AM. BAR
ASS’N (Aug. 8, 2011), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/
080811-texas-loser-pays—rule.html [https://perma.cc/U4NQ-8JUV].
14. See Angela Morris, Attention-Getting Loser-Pays Not the Star of H.B. 274, TEX.
LAW. (June 6, 2011), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/6616b4df-b76b-4b2b-ba80-
8a9afd141e35/?context=1000516.
15. See Pryor, supra note 9, at 116; see also PRYOR, supra note 1, at 127.
16. Frank Evans, Redesigning ADR Protocols for Efficiency and Affordability, ALTER-
NATIVE RESOLUTIONS, Winter 2015, at 10, 13.
17. Id. at 10.
18. See Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 64 SMU L. REV. 3, 6 (2011).
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A. THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE WAS ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE . . .
It has become dogma in Texas that “arbitration is strongly favored.”19
Truer words have never been spoken. In this Survey year we will briefly
examine five appellate challenges to the enforceability of an arbitration
clause. In all five cases the clause was enforced.
1. Unconscionable?
In Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, LLP v. Francisco “Frank”
Lopez, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the conscionability and en-
forceability of an arbitration provision in an attorney-client employment
contract. Both the trial court and the court of appeals agreed that the
arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable, primarily be-
cause the clause required the client to arbitrate any claims it might have
against the law firm. But the lower courts allowed the law firm to litigate
its claims for fees and expenses against the client.20
The supreme court summarized two legal points of note: “Arbitration
agreements may be either substantively or procedurally unconscionable,
or both”21 and “arbitration clauses in attorney-client employment con-
tracts are not presumptively unconscionable.”22 The supreme court went
on to conclude that “although the provision was one-sided in the sense
that it excepted any fee claims by [the firm] from its scope, excepting that
one type of dispute does not make the agreement so grossly one-sided as
to be unconscionable.”23 Now apparently, that one-sidedness—even in an
attorney-client contract—must be grossly one-sided to invalidate an arbi-
tration clause.24 This gives us an insight into how presumptively Texas
appellate courts favor arbitration these days.
In Venture Cotton Cooperative v. Freeman,25 the Eastland Court of Ap-
peals, having been previously reversed by the Texas Supreme Court, re-
considered arguments that an arbitration clause was substantively
unconscionable in an agreement between a cotton-marketing cooperative
and twenty-eight cotton farmers. There were three challenges to finding
substantive unconscionability: (1) whether the co-op’s rules provided a
cost-prohibitive forum; (2) whether the co-op’s rules limited the farmers’
right to discovery; and (3) whether a conflict of interest existed between
the co-op and the neutral service provider.26
19. Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 499 (Tex.
2015).
20. Id. at 497.
21. Id. at 499.
22. Id. at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 502.
24. See id.
25. No. 11-11-00093-CV, 2015 WL 1967251 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2015, no
pet.); see also Pryor, supra note 1, at 114 (addressing the previous appellate court decision,
Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 395 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013), rev’d,
435 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. 2014)).
26. Freeman, 2015 WL 1967251, at *3.
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The court of appeals only tossed aside the first challenge after an ex-
tremely lengthy analysis and a conclusion that the co-op presented no
evidence of costs that would prevent pursuit of a claim.27 The second
challenge was rather quickly dismissed: “[U]ntil an arbitrator actually de-
nies Appellees’ requests for discovery, it is only speculative that Appel-
lees’ right to discovery will be limited.”28 Finally, the conflict of interest
challenge (the manager of the co-op was also a board member of the
industry association who’s arbitration rules were adopted in the contract,
and both shared the same legal counsel) was also dismissed.29 “Until [the
cotton farmers] are denied access to unbiased arbitrators, it would be a
matter of pure speculation to find that there is a conflict of interest that
will not be resolved.”30 To put this in a different context, if an owner of a
Big Tex Arbitration Company inserts a “Big Tex Arbitration Company”
clause in the agreement, the court of appeals seems to suggest that
“[w]hile it is possible that the arbitral forum will be biased . . . it is simply
that—a mere possibility.”31 If you think this curious reasoning (maybe
there is a conflict, but the parties will probably work it out) suggests that
perhaps the court of appeals could read the handwriting on the wall, and
did not want to be reversed again by the supreme court, you are not
alone.
2. Waiver?
Waiver has been a subject of numerous appellate court decisions in re-
cent years. After the Texas Supreme Court’s landmark Perry Homes v.
Cull32 decision in 2008, appellate courts have addressed waiver in the
“substantially invoked judicial process” context.
The Texas Supreme Court once again took up the waiver argument in
Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Systems, L.L.C.33 The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals had determined that the filing of motions and
pleadings in the trial court, requesting continuances, meeting with oppos-
ing counsel over a Rule 11 agreement, requesting discovery delays, and
suffering sanctions from the trial court impliedly waived arbitration.34 In
its second reversal of the court of appeals, the Texas Supreme Court reit-
erated that there is a strong presumption against waiver, and that the
court of appeals had misapplied the Perry Homes v. Cull test.35 The test,
27. Id. at *3–5.
28. Id. at *5.
29. Id. at *6.
30. Id.
31. See id. at *7.
32. 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008); see also Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62
SMU L. REV. 843, 845–47 (2009).
33. 455 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam); see also Pryor, supra note 9, at 105–06
(addressing the appellate court decision, Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge
Sys., L.L.C., 392 S.W. 3d 633 (Tex. 2013), remanded to 453 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2013), rev’d 455 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. 2015)).
34. Richmont Holding, Inc., 455 S.W.3d at 576.
35. Id. at 574–75.
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when applied correctly, finds that waiver only occurs when one party
“substantially invoke[s] the judicial process to the other party’s detriment
or prejudice.”36
Reinforcing the strong presumption against waiver, we come to Cedillo
v. Immobilier Jeuness Establissement37 from the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals. Here, the defendants—the parties pursuing arbitra-
tion—”filed a motion to transfer venue in September 2012.”38 The court
of appeals, however, noted that “filing a motion to transfer venue does
not waive arbitration.”39 Further, the court of appeals noted that twenty-
eight months transpired between the filing of the lawsuit and the motion
to compel arbitration.40 During this period, little discovery had occurred,
no depositions had been taken, no third-party discovery had occurred,
and no motions to compel had been filed. The party seeking to compel
arbitration argued that its counsel had only discovered the existence of
the arbitration clause when they began producing documents. Rejecting
that argument, the court of appeals reasoned that “[a]lthough this expla-
nation may be implausible, ‘mere delay in moving to compel arbitration is
not enough for waiver.’”41
To summarize, when trying to avoid arbitration on the grounds that the
other side’s litigation conduct amounts to “substantially invoking judicial
process” and constitutes waiver, good luck.
Waiver in this Survey year also leads to the discussion of a national
legal and public policy debate concerning arbitration clauses in employ-
ment and consumer circumstances, and whether employees and consum-
ers can legitimately waive their right to class action relief.42 This skirmish
has been ongoing at least since 2005 when a decision came down from the
California Supreme Court, holding that class-arbitration waivers in con-
sumer contracts amount to contracts of adhesion.43 In 2011, the U.S. Su-
preme Court essentially reversed the California decision.44
The skirmish, however, continues. In DirectTV v. Imburgia, the U.S.
Supreme Court, invoking pre-emption of the Federal Arbitration Act
over state law, reasoned that a class action waiver was flawed by the ex-
pression of the “law of your state,” which necessarily invoked invalid Cal-
36. Id.
37. 476 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
38. Id. at 571.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (quoting Richmont Holdings, Inc., 455 S.W.3d at 576).
42. See generally Federal Agency Announces It Will Seek To Ban Class Waivers in
Arbitration, 33 ALTERNATIVES 155 (2015) (addressing a thorough summary and analysis of
how the federal government, through the recently formed Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and the NLRB is going about trying to invalidate class waivers in consumer and
employment arbitration agreements administratively, rather than legislatively or judi-
cially); Cutting Arbitration Classes: Facing Court Defeats on Workplace Waivers, the NLRB
Refuses to Back Down, 34 ALTERNATIVES 1 (2016) (same).
43. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, 162–63 (2005), abrogated by
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
44. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
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ifornia law, meaning pre-emption applied.45 Does this not seem overly
complicated? This author could not agree more with John Allen Chalk of
Fort Worth—publisher of The Arbitration Newsletter and an eminent au-
thority on arbitration in the State of Texas—who reviewed this opinion
and suggested, “[e]very word, phrase, clause, and sentence in a pre-dis-
pute arbitration clause must be given thoughtful and considered atten-
tion, especially the clause’s unintended consequences.”46
3. Other Challenges Overruled
Although unconscionability and waiver may be the most common chal-
lenges, parties will attempt to avoid arbitration for a variety of other rea-
sons. For example, AVIC International USA, Inc. v. Tang Energy Group,
Ltd. presented a challenge to the method by which a nine-member arbi-
trator panel was chosen.47 The U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the
Federal Arbitration Act on the very narrow grounds that allow judicial
intervention in panelist selection.48 This author is curious whether the
drafters of the arbitration provision calling for a nine-member panel truly
thought that the appointment process would be seamless!
In Brock Services, LLC v. Solis, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
reversed a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration.49 At is-
sue was the scope of the arbitration, often referred to as arbitrability. The
court determined that a valid arbitration agreement existed and found a
“clear and unmistakable” intent to submit questions of arbitrability to the
arbitrator: “Parties show a ‘clear and unmistakable’ intent . . . by either
(1) including a clause in the agreement that directs this function to the
arbitrator or (2) incorporating rules in the agreement that empower the
arbitrator to determine arbitrability.”50 Consequently, in this employ-
ment dispute, the arbitrator was ultimately left to determine whether the
departed employee’s claim for retaliation was subject to arbitration.51
Separability is a principle in arbitration law that holds that an arbitra-
tion clause is separable and survives even if the underlying contract is
terminated or found invalid.52 In the context of a brokerage agreement
created when a bank customer opened an IRA, the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals, in BBVA Compass Investment Solutions, Inc. v. Brooks, turned
back several challenges to the arbitration clause, including the argument
that the “contractual relationship between the parties ended once Appel-
45. DirectTV v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).
46. John Allen Chalk, Pre-emption or Consumer Protection? THE ARBITRATION
NEWSLETTER, Jan. 2016, at 1, 3.
47. No. 3:14-cv-2815-K, 2015 WL 477316, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2015).
48. Id. at *5.
49. Brock Servs., LLC v. Solis, No. 13-15-00204-CV, 2015 WL 5895083, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. BBVA Compass Inv. Sols., Inc. v. Brooks, 456 S.W.3d 711, 718 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2015, no pet.).
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lants liquidated and closed the account.”53 Also of interest is the court of
appeals’s dismissal of the challenge that tort claims are typically not sub-
ject to arbitration of contractual disputes: “[A] court must determine if
the tort claim ‘is so interwoven with the contract that it could not stand
alone, or on the other hand, is completely independent of the contract
that it could be maintained without reference to the contract.’”54
Now we consider the pre-emption doctrine in the context of a state law,
the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA), and a legislative goal of regu-
lating the arbitration of health care liability claims. In Fredericksburg
Care Company, L.P. v. Perez, the Texas Supreme Court held that an arbi-
tration agreement between a Texas nursing home health care provider
and a patient was enforceable, regardless of whether the agreement com-
plied with state law.55 The provider argued that the TMLA was enacted
to regulate the insurance business. If so, the federal McCarran-Ferguson
Act,56 which protects the regulation of insurance by states from pre-emp-
tion, would prevail over normal pre-emption of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).57 The arbitration clause in the contract admittedly did not
comply with the TMLA.58 But the supreme court determined that be-
cause the state law did not sufficiently concern the business of regulating
insurance, there was no shield from FAA pre-emption, and the arbitra-
tion clause was enforceable.59
B. VACATURE OF AWARD
Having seen that appellate courts throughout Texas mean it when they
say, “arbitration is highly favored,” let’s examine whether such support-
ive treatment exists at the back end of the process, when the losing party
asks a court to set aside an arbitration award, often referred to as
vacature.
For almost a century, a body of common law developed surrounding
arbitration awards and their validity. Part of the basis for the increasing
popularity of arbitration was the notion that even though arbitration is
final and binding, there was always comfort that if something went wrong
or if an arbitration panel went completely capricious, the courts could at
least set an award aside if the result amounted to a “manifest disregard of
the law” or similar standard. This reassuring safety net was taken away by
the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 2008 decision, Hall Street v. Mattel,
which ruled that the specific and narrow grounds listed in the FAA for
vacating an arbitration award were exclusive.60
53. Id. at 717.
54. Id. at 720.
55. Fredericksburg Care Co., L.P. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513, 528 (Tex. 2015), cert. de-
nied, Perez v. Fredericksburg Care Co., LP, 136 S. Ct. 798 (2016).
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012).
57. Fredericksburg, 461 S.W.3d at 517–18.
58. Id. at 516.
59. Id. at 528.
60. Hall Street v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008).
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Since Mattel, appellate lawyers seeking vacature of an arbitration
award have been casting a keen eye on the FAA’s enumerated grounds,
primarily focusing on the evident partiality and exceeded authority
grounds. It is as if, in pending appeals all across the land, lawyers
amended their briefs, “we’re sorry; when we said ‘manifestly disregarded
the law,’ what we really meant was ‘exceeded authority!’” Let us first
look at how courts in Texas treated claims of exceeded authority during
the Survey year.
We start with the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals opinion, D.R.
Horton-Texas, Ltd. v. Bernhard, where the court of appeals denied a peti-
tion for review by the Texas Supreme Court.61 Here, the homebuyers’
sales contract with the builder contained an arbitration clause; the clause
provided that each party in arbitration would bear its own fees, costs and
expenses.62 The arbitrator eventually published an award in favor of the
homebuyers, including a substantial amount of attorneys’ fees that the
arbitrator classified as economic damages under the Residential Con-
struction Liability Act (RCLA).63 The builder protested, arguing that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers under the Texas Arbitration Act.64 The
court of appeals concluded that the proper inquiry is “not whether the
arbitrator decided an issue correctly, but instead whether she had the au-
thority to decide the issue at all.”65 Because RCLA authorizes an award
of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party, the arbitrator did not exceed his
authority.66
To compare, in City of Arlington v. Kovacs, we have an award tossed
by Fort Worth Court of Appeals because the arbitrator exceeded his au-
thority.67 Here, a city employee had been terminated for violating numer-
ous personnel rules, but an arbitrator reinstated the employee. The award
explicitly discussed evidence of facts developed after the employee’s ter-
mination, facts neither known to the employer nor made part of the deci-
sion to terminate. The court of appeals held that “[b]y considering the
post-termination evidence, the arbitrator improperly pursued an inquiry
beyond the scope of the [employer’s] charging instrument, thus departing
from his authority as clearly and unambiguously confined by the same
document.”68
61. D.R. Horton-Texas, Ltd. v. Bernhard, 423 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
62. Id. at 533.
63. Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 27.004(g)(6) (West 2014) (allowing a claimant to
recover reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as economic damages).
64. D.R. Horton-Texas, Ltd., 423 S.W.3d at 533.
65. Id. at 534 (quoting LeFoumba v. Legend Classic Homes, Ltd., No. 14-08-00243-
CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 773, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 17, 2009, no
pet.) (mem. op.)).
66. Id. at 535.
67. City of Arlington v. Kovacs, No. 02-14-00281-CV, 2015 WL 4776100, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2015, no pet.).
68. Id.
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What if, after an award is published, the losing party stumbles across a
possible conflict of interest of one of the arbitrators—a prior relationship
with opposing counsel perhaps—that was undisclosed? Such evidence
might be the basis for vacature of the award if it amounts to evident parti-
ality. Are you as counsel entitled to discovery on this issue?
The answer is yes in Rodas v. La Madeleine of Texas, Inc.69 The Dallas
Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion
by denying a motion to compel discovery regarding evident partiality
when a party presented facts indicating that the sole arbitrator failed to
disclose two subsequent appointments by the law firm of opposing coun-
sel during the pendency of the claimant’s case.70 In the post-Mattel legal
playground of evident partiality, much of the attention has centered on
disclosures—or the lack of disclosures—of conflicts of interest or circum-
stances giving rise to the appearance of a conflict by candidates for the
arbitration panel. Even a seemingly “neutral arbitrator exhibits evident
partiality if he does not disclose facts which might, to an objective ob-
server, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator’s partiality.”71
Here, the court of appeals granted the claimant’s discovery request:
Because discovery is permissible if it is reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence . . . and [the claimant’s] re-
quested discovery is directed at her evident partiality grounds for
attempting to vacate the award, the proceedings described above
(acknowledgement of subsequent arbitrator appointments) support
allowing her to conduct her requested discovery.72
The final opinion reveals nothing but the unpredictability of judicial
analysis. Arbitrators are tasked with preparing and publishing a final
award.73 Historically, the most popular and sensible form of such an
award is referred to as a standard award.74 The simple definition of a
standard award is “short and sweet,” or perhaps, “the less said the bet-
ter.”75 In a standard award, an arbitrator essentially declares a winner
and loser and sets forth the relief, if any, that one of the parties will en-
joy.76 Many observers view the standard award as the form that best rep-
resents the goals of efficiency and finality: long hallmarks of arbitration.77
Occasionally, the parties will request a form of award familiar to
courts: “findings of fact and conclusions of law.”78 A detailed findings of
69. No. 05-14-00054-CV, 2015 WL 1611780, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 10, 2015,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
70. Id.
71. Id. at *3 (quoting Burlington N.R.R. v TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 630, 636 (Tex.
1997)).
72. Id. at *6.
73. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.053 (West 2011).
74. See SSP Holdings Ltd. P’ship v. Lopez, 432 S.W.3d. 487, 494 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2014, no. pet.).
75. See id.; Stage Stores Inc. v. Jon Gunnerson, 477 S.W.3d 848, 857 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
76. See Stage Stores, 477 S.W.3d at 857.
77. SSP Holdings, 432 S.W.3d at 494.
78. See Stage Stores, 477 S.W.3d at 857.
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fact award would presumably be more popular in a venue where an ap-
peal is either reasonably anticipated or virtually certain. Arbitration is
not that venue.
Often, however, the parties will agree to yet a third form of award, the
reasoned award.79 The parties requesting a reasoned award may have
mixed desires. Although reasoned awards presumably will add time and
expense to the process, the parties may feel that a dispute deserves the
added attention. These parties ask, “how can we go through this entire
process and not know how or why the arbitrator reached his or her deci-
sion?” A cynical observer might suggest another motive: Reasoned
awards theoretically create more arguments and opportunities for
vacature.
For whatever reasons, the parties in Stage Stores, Inc. v. Jon Gunnerson
requested a reasoned award.80 The arbitration agreement called for arbi-
tration under the FAA, pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration
Association. In a scheduling order, the parties agreed to the reasoned
award. In a four-page opinion, the arbitrator included a statement of ju-
risdiction, identification of the parties, a statement of the issues, a recita-
tion of procedural facts, the arbitrator’s rulings, and the arbitrator’s
damage award. The First Houston Court of Appeals found that “[t]his
[was] clearly more than a standard award.”81
The appellant argued that the award was not a reasoned award because
it discussed some, but not all, of its key defenses, and the court of appeals
agreed,82 acknowledging, “[w]e cannot fill in this gap for the arbitra-
tor.”83 The court of appeals remanded the matter to the trial court to
further remand to the arbitrator.84 And the court of appeals outlined the
future procedural steps: “After the arbitrator issues a revised award ac-
counting for this deficiency, the matter will return to the trial court for
final determination of whether the award should be confirmed or
vacated.”85
This author believes that this case was wrongly decided. In arbitration,
enormous discretion is ordinarily extended to the arbitrator in fashioning
whatever form of award the parties request. Here, the court of appeals
found that “even if the arbitrator was not completely successful, the
award largely conforms to the requirements for being a reasoned
award.”86 But, because the parties had not agreed on a more elaborate
definition of a reasoned award, and because the arbitrator discussed
some, but not all, of the issues in the case, the case was remanded to the
79. See id. at 858–59; SSP Holdings, 432 S.W.3d at 494.
80. See Stage Stores, 477 S.W.3d at 853.
81. Id. at 859.
82. Id. at 860.
83. Id. at 863.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 859.
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arbitrator for clarification.87 Is the arbitrator’s reaction to the remand not
entirely predictable? Have any parties to an arbitration ever thought it
necessary or appropriate to provide a definition to the expression rea-
soned award?
In reviewing this decision, the opinion of a well-recognized authority in
Texas concluded as follows:
For advocates and practitioners, the lesson appears to be clear. To
avoid this kind of confusion with awards, and thus avoid costly and
time-consuming remands, define “reasoned award” at the outset so
that the Arbitrator can thereafter clearly understand his or her obli-
gation to comply with the parties’ agreement.88
This author, however, disagrees. Any attempt to define reasoned award—
a term that should need no definition—will only create more ambiguity.
The term has been used in thousands of arbitration clauses for decades
and has accordingly earned the right to stand alone.
87. Id. at 863.
88. Lionel Schooler, What is a Reasoned Award? ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTIONS, Fall/
Winter 2015–2016, at 9, 11.
